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Abstract: 
This article argues against the long-standing instinct to read African politics in terms of 
programmatic versus patrimonial politics. Unlike the assumptions of much of the current 
quantitative literature, there are substantive political struggles that go beyond ‘public goods 
good, private goods bad’. Scholarly framings serve to obscure the essentially contested nature 
of what counts as legitimate distribution. This article uses the recent political history of the 
Lagos Model in southwest Nigeria to show that the idea of patrimonial versus programmatic 
politics does not stand outside of politics but is in itself a politically constructed distinction. 
In adopting it a priori as scholars we commit ourselves to seeing the world through the eyes 
of a specific, often elite, constituency that makes up only part of the rich landscape of 
normative political contestation in Nigeria. Finally, the example of a large-scale 
empowerment scheme in Oyo State shows the complexity of politicians’ attempts to render 
distribution legitimate to different audiences at once.  
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INTRODUCTION: THE SHIFTING DIVIDE BETWEEN LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE DISTRIBUTION 
‘This government is so insensitive, lacks human face and basically they are clueless. 
[The Governor] his supporters say ‘If you go to the poultry you won’t believe how 
clean it is’ and we ask ‘what is the magic?’ and we check, the poultry is clean but the 
chicken are not there! ... He forgets all the time that being in government is about 
serving the people.’ 
Teslim Folarin, Gubernatorial Candidate for the People’s Democratic Party, Oyo 
State
i
  
“There are a billion poor people in the world. Why don’t we just find the poor and give them 
one dollar a week and do nothing else. No questions asked. What they do with the money is 
not our concern. That would probably do more to relieve poverty than anything else.” 
Meghnad Desai, director of the London School of Economics Centre for the Study of Global 
Governance, 2003.
ii
  
 
All politics involves distribution. Indeed, many would claim that politics is at its heart about 
controlling distribution: who gets what, when and how. Whether a particular distributive 
decisions are perceived as legitimate depends to a large extent on how they are framed by 
normative ideas. Some of these norms are so widely shared as to be taken for granted, 
whereas others are subject to disagreement. Policies and programmes that fall in this grey 
zone present a window onto fundamental debates over the role of the state and the aims of 
development. For example, in January 2019 opposition parties and civil society groups in 
Nigeria condemned a federal government empowerment scheme as “sophisticated voter-
inducement” (“TraderMoni is vote buying, says Transparency International,” 2019). The 
TraderMoni scheme, launched in 2016 and implemented by the Bank of Industry disbursed 
collateral free loans totalling N12 billion to over a million recipients. Even among its 
opponents, the grounds on which the scheme was judged to be illegitimate varied: it was too 
close to the election, it was not in the party’s manifesto or it constituted the use of public 
funds for party-specific aims  (“Saraki to FG,” 2018). Thus the question of how to draw the 
line between legitimate distributive strategies that win votes and illegitimate vote-buying 
strategies is a live topic in Africa’s biggest democracy. 
Unsurprisingly, where to draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate distribution is 
highly political: as seen in archetypal left-right debates over taxation and the legitimacy of 
the market as a mechanism for distribution. Distributive strategies can be evaluated according 
to whether they are instrumentally valuable - do they bring about desirable outcomes? - as 
well as intrinsically, in light of the principles or values they embody. These theoretical 
complexities also play out in negotiations of patronage’s normative framing at the micro-
level. Voters may regard material goodies given as patronage “as pieces of information that 
reveal the positive personal qualities of the giver, such as generosity, politeness, 
responsiveness, and respect…” or else demonstrating a “personal defect on the part of the 
giver, such as arrogance and disrespect.” Depending on its normative framing, vote-buying 
can be either a virtue or a vice (Schaffer and Schedler, 2007, p. 17).  
The normative fluidity of distributive strategies is not simply an esoteric aspect of popular 
politics. Even within the development industry, which is characterised by less overtly 
political and more technocratic approaches, ideas about what constitutes legitimate 
distribution have changed over time. The most notable recent shift has been with regards to 
direct cash transfers. Whilst an acceptance of the need for social protection has come to 
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occupy a central plank in development thinking as part of a “quiet revolution” (Barrientos 
and Hulme 2009) it is worth remembering just how controversial this was when it was first 
suggested. In 2004, Joseph Hanlon (2004) asked in a leading development journal “Is it 
possible to just give money to the poor?” His claim that yes it is possible and, what’s more, 
advisable, was intentionally provocative. Whilst cash transfers and wider social protection 
schemes are now a regular component of mainstream development programmes, at the time 
they went against the reigning wisdom of how money should be spent and by whom, with 
attendant beliefs about the deservingness and rationality of the poor.  
This article interrogates how certain distributions come to be legitimate by reconsidering a 
conceptual framework that has been highly influential in scholarly understandings of African 
politics: patrimonial versus programmatic politics. I argue that this lens is just one possible 
conceptual tool among many. It foregrounds some aspects of Nigeria’s political development 
whilst obscuring others. This conceptual division – and the concomitant normative judgement 
about which sorts of distribution are legitimate - has been naturalised into the political vision 
of progressive Yoruba politicians in the southwest who since the 2000s have promoted what I 
call the ‘Lagos Model’. The same lens mean that certain distributive strategies in which 
Nigerian leaders regularly engage – namely the direct distribution of food, money and 
material goods, known in Oyo State as amala politics – were rendered unacceptable, apart 
from where they facilitated programmatic change. Debates over the package of distributive 
options both permitted and foreclosed by the Lagos Model represent a continuation of long-
running contestation within Yoruba political history, extending to patterns of leadership 
established under the Old Oyo Empire, over what constitutes legitimate distributive 
strategies.  
De-naturalising the programmatic versus patrimonial distinction allows us to better 
understand the dynamics shaping politics around the 2015 gubernatorial election. First I show 
how the Governor and his party sought to reconstitute politics in Oyo State through the 
framing of patrimonial versus programmatic politics, and to present themselves as embodying 
the latter. I show how the boundaries of legitimate distribution is in itself subject to political 
contestation. Distributive programmes that sat uncomfortably with Ajimobi’s stated aim to 
deliver programmatic politics became an essential part of his efforts to garner popular 
support. The same concrete acts of material distribution were simultaneously framed in two 
opposing ways, each implying different claims about what distributive strategies are 
legitimate. Those distributive elements which were too reminiscent of patrimonial politics to 
survive re-framing for international audiences were strategically hidden. My analysis draws 
on a total of 6 months in-depth qualitative fieldwork over two trips, first in October -
December 2013 and then April – August 2015. I conducted over 150 focus groups and 
interviews with traders, civil servants, politicians and others in a mixture of Yoruba, English 
and Pidgin, assisted at times by tri-lingual research assistants. A smaller number of follow up 
interviews in July 2018 – when Ajimobi was 3 years into his second term – allowed me to 
test my conclusions with my informants. Finally I return to the current scholarship on 
programmatic politics and highlight how programmatic politics restricts the distributive 
options open to African governments. Whereas discourse is often seen as simply concerned 
with ‘valence issues’, this article points to news ways in which normative politics in Nigeria 
reflects debates over essentially contested notions of development, the state and legitimate 
distribution.   
1. Theorising distribution and good politics in Africa 
The question of what sort of distributive strategies are legitimate takes on heightened 
importance in the study of politics in Africa. Though different methodologies utilise different 
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conceptual vocabularies, implicit conceptions of good and bad politics typically rely on a 
division between legitimate and illegitimate distribution. It is worth sketching the stylised 
assumptions of these approaches, before opening up to the increasing nuance with which they 
are operationalised. Drawing on the language of neo-classical economics, quantitative 
political scientists divide distributive strategies into those providing private goods – typically 
small-scale goods for private consumption – and public goods from which citizens can derive 
long-term generalised benefits. Political systems are then evaluated depending on the relative 
prevalence of each in of electoral appeals (Vicente and Wantchekon, 2009). Where 
politicians compete to deliver public goods they embody values of accountability, 
competition and responsiveness. Democracy is thus valuable because it provides a system for 
‘making politics work for development’ (World Bank, 2016). Distribution of private goods is 
illegitimate not only because of the opportunity cost of spending on public goods but because 
it short-circuits democratic accountability through vote-buying (Lindberg, 2013).  
Researchers rooted in political economy, sociology and anthropology invoke concepts like 
clientelism, patronage politics and (neo-)patrimonialism to problematize the way that 
personalistic authority structures undermine whole political systems (Bratton and van de 
Walle, 1994). The more sympathetic accounts locate the origins of patrimonial politics in 
‘moral economies’ whereby the Big Men are legitimate on the basis of communal or affective 
values (Olivier de Sardan, 1999). On this view, thus patrimonial distribution may have its 
own internal logic by which it reflects important values, but these are conceived as being 
incompatible with modern democracies as well as leading to ultimately anti-developmental 
consequences. For example, Jeffrey Paller (2014, p. 123) highlights the informal values of 
friendship, capitalist entrepreneurship, family, and religion to show that patrimonial politics 
is not devoid of values, as might be suggested the economistic literature that treats private 
goods distribution as necessarily an obstacle to accountability. However, regardless of how 
intrinsically valuable these informal practices are, for Paller they still pose a threat to 
democratic values properly understood. In contrast to patrimonialism, programmatic politics 
is seen as a more legitimate way of marrying distributive strategies with democratic 
accountability (Nic Cheeseman, 2014). Voters should choose between rival parties on the 
basis of substantive public programmes that they promise to implement. Whilst sharing the 
same basic idea as the economists divide between public and private goods, a focus on 
programmatic politics gives a much richer account of the broader organisational environment 
this requires and it recognises that different voters will prioritise different sorts of public 
goods for instance trading off roads for hospitals (Sanches, 2018).  
Of course these schematic simplistic binaries of public goods versus private goods, and 
patrimonial versus programmatic politics belies considerable nuance within the 
corresponding literatures. At the macro-level, there is a recognition that under certain 
condition patrimonial politics can be ‘hacked’ and put to the service of more programmatic 
objectives. The possibility of ‘developmental patrimonialism’ in places like Rwanda suggests 
that patrimonialism can act as an instrument for centralising rents and channelling patronage 
into long-term investments (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). Mushtaq Khan’s work on 
political settlements accepts patrimonial politics as a fact of life in many countries in the 
global South (Khan, 2005). This opens the possibility that patronage can be legitimate insofar 
as it is productive. Such pragmatism was part of a wider shift in development studies towards 
accepting that patronage could be productive under certain conditions. Whether under the 
banner of ‘good enough governance’ (Grindle, 2004), ‘going with the grain’(Kelsall, 2011) or 
a pragmatic embrace of ‘what works’ (Hossain, 2007), scholars and practitioners become 
more accepting of regimes that that deviate from purely programmatic criteria but deliver the 
goods. Together these show that whilst patrimonialism is not intrinsically desirable it is 
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possible for it to be instrumentally useful. Similarly, analyses of ‘electoral clientelism’ show 
how democratic competition be sustained alongside patrimonialism (Kramon, 2017).  
At the same time there has been increased attention in political science to “the nuts and bolts 
of African politics” (Lindberg, 2010, p. 118).  Fine-grained empirical studies reveal that 
mechanisms associated with patron-client relations may nonetheless be harnessed by citizens 
to demand public goods. Voters in Niamey, Niger engage in personal contact with their 
representatives, through visits and phone calls, but use that private contact to make 
programmatic requests (Mueller, 2018, p. 44). Alternatively, clientelistic demands may be 
met with programmatic responses: in Ghana “the intense pressures for … strictly private 
needs can lead office holders to provide collective goods” as a more sustainable solution 
(Lindberg, 2010, p. 137). Even where politicians do distribute private goods in advance of 
elections this doesn’t always serve to ‘short-circuit’ the demand for public goods, but may 
function as a signalling device to show that the candidate has the requisite means and status 
to deliver if elected (Gadjanova, 2017). Thus the division of legitimate and illegitimate 
distribution remains the line between public and private goods, but this can be incorporated 
into a considerably more contextualised analysis of how politics works on the ground in 
African countries.  
Notwithstanding these debates among scholars of patrimonial politics, there remains an 
underlying consensus of where to draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate 
distributive strategies. This is despite the recognition in development studies more broadly 
that this division is both contested and liable to shift over time. As shown by the shifting 
status of social protection and cash transfers, what looks like a wasteful frittering away of 
public funds in the hands of the undeserving poor under one development regime, is a 
transformative social protection programme in another. If we are to apply this insight to the 
study of African politics we open up the possibility that practices currently seen as 
patrimonial – including the allocation of small scale goods for private consumption - could 
emerge as legitimate distributive strategies: not because patrimonialism is in fact OK but 
because the practices in question defy the implicit normative distinctions of the 
patrimonialism label.  
2. Distributive politics in southwest Nigeria in historical context 
Historical debates over legitimate distribution: 
The political history of Yorubaland can be charted in a series of tussles over the distributive 
duties of leaders From pre-colonial times, the norms of leadership dictated that not only 
should leaders be military figures, but they should cultivate a following of clients, through 
their patronage and generosity.  The “gaze” of followers confers ola a form of social honour 
or authority (Watson, 1998, p. 467). Traditional oriki poetry and proverbs reflect norms of 
generosity and the importance of leaders sharing their wealth. An oriki from 1871 remarks 
about one leader that “there’s always something to eat in [his] house” and of his followers 
who eat from his ‘thousands of plates’ in his kitchen (Watson, 2000, p. 477). The English 
translation of a Yoruba proverb re-affirms these values: one cannot be tight-fisted (selfish), 
and be endowed with honour (Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007, p. 432). Of course, ideas about 
legitimate distribution were contested. Yet money has negative associations too, “as a 
destabilizer and corrupter” (Agbaje, 2002, p. 5). Through Ibadan’s history its populace has 
been cautious about the generosity of wealthy leaders, on the basis that acceptance of 
patronage should not oblige the populace to support irresponsible leaders (Barber, 1995; 
Guyer, 1995). Omobowale and Olutayo (2010, p. 459) argue that in Yoruba society patrons 
are chosen not only on the basis of their financial clout but also their good character, based on 
“philanthropic deeds and wisdom.” What a patron is able to provide materially is closely 
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intertwined with what they can contribute emotionally, and in terms of advice and playing 
being a good baba-isale or role model (Omobowale, 2008). Therefore whilst leaders are 
expected to share economic benefits, this must be done appropriately, and patronage cannot 
trump accountable leadership. Moreover, distribution monopolise the expectations of the 
duties of power, with distributive norms sitting alongside and often in tension with demands 
for progress and the need for leaders to rise up through the correct channels that might 
guarantee their integrity.    
By the mid twentieth century two broad lines of politics had been established. On one side 
were conservative populists who placed direct distribution at the centre of their conception of 
good governance. Populist godfather figures since the 1950s are described as ‘people-based’ 
leaders who ‘operated an open door policy’ (Adeyemo, 2008). One of the recurring motifs of 
accessibility in these historical accounts is of the leader eating with his lowly followers. In 
the 1950s as Chairman of Ibadan District Council and later the leader of the opposition in 
what was then the Western Region, Adegoke Adelabu, ‘stooped to take meals and drinks 
communally with his admirers in side-sheds and market stalls’ (Layonu, 2003, p. 107). 
Whilst such norms tend to be associated with ‘moral economies’ of affection and inter-
personal obligation, here they took shape in inescapably political contexts: leaders with large-
scale jurisdictions backed up by state power. As explained by Gavin Williams in his account 
of Ibadan politics in the 1940s the obligation for leaders to engage in direct distribution was 
evidence of popular negotiations of the material inequalities of power and resources brought 
about by the modern state. Adelabu’s support base was among the socially excluded mekunnu 
– cocoa workers. The ‘mekennu’ movement renounced the power of Western education as a 
means of controlling state resources and the inequality that resulted. He promised to “secure 
for the small man the favours that were monopolized by the (predominantly educated) ‘big 
men’”. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s Lamidi Adedibu became the most powerful figure in 
Oyo state, distributing daily bowls of amala and gbegiri, via a followership comprised on 
mass grassroots associations: social groups, religious unions and trade unions (Omobowale 
and Olutayo, 2010, p. 454; Animasawun, 2013, p. 15). Adedibu, was celebrated for the way 
he embedded the material fact of patronage in a legacy of norms and values (Omobowale and 
Olutayo, 2007; Timothy, 2008). 
The second major line consisted of progressives who rejected this conception of distribution, 
casting it as backward and personalistic. For progressives like Obafemi Awolowo, first Prime 
Minister of the Western Region, the duty of government was to the resources over which the 
state had control and distribute them in ways that transformed society and the individuals 
within it. Awolowo combined progressive politics with Yoruba cultural nationalism: his 
party, the Action Group, enacted this vision of enlightened leadership and transformative 
social policy built on the idea of olaju (Peel, 1983, p. 159). Among this group Yoruba 
identity became consolidated as ‘inherently modern’ and ‘progressive’ (Adebanwi, 2014, p. 
59) whereby their collective characteristics as outward-looking and sophisticated would be 
the basis for transcending the political stagnation represented by the likes of Adegoke and 
Adedibu.  
Thus for the progressives the lens of patrimonial versus programmatic politics was a snug fit 
with their political worldview. For the populists, it is at best a misunderstanding of the 
realities of inequality that result from power, and at worst a cynical ploy to fence off the 
benefits of state power by elites who don’t trust their poorer compatriots. Politicians from 
both populist and progressive camps in southwest Nigeria have always been forced to 
innovate in response to the failures of their rivals. Following democratisation in 1999, 
progressive controlled the state for 4 years under the banner of Action Congress before the 
  
7 
 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) took over from 2003 to 2011. PDP candidates backed by 
Adedibu capitalised on grievances with elite-driven long-term development policies that 
ignore popular demands for more immediate distribution of economic benefits in the face of 
widespread poverty (Adebanwi, 2005, p. 20; Hoffmann and Nolte, 2013). Rashidi Ladoja and 
Christopher Adebayo Alao-Akala presided over growing public disorder as the capital, 
Ibadan, gained a reputation for violent street battles and ‘godfatherism’. Whilst Ladoja 
eventually forged a career independent of Adedibu’s support, Akala earned the nickname 
‘ATM’ and was widely seen as a caricature of the distributive ideals. A common remark I 
heard during my fieldwork in 2013 and 2015 was that he was a scoundrel but at least during 
his time in office money was flowing. Support for amala politics does not mean it is blindly 
accepted as good politics, but it reflects a grudging acceptance of a form of politics that 
offered some minimal concessions to material reality in which people live and the normative 
values through which governments must demonstrate their sensitivity to that reality.  
Punctuating this history were periods of military rule and dictatorship. As the military handed 
over to a civilian government in 1998 and prepared for democratisation, Yoruba politicians 
from the pro-democracy movement saw the chance to assert the dominance of the 
progressives once and for all. Just as the scholarly lens of programmatic versus patrimonial 
politics sees the latter as destined to fall away in the face of mounting modernisation and 
institutionalisation, this band of politicians saw their role as ushering in a fateful return to 
politics as it always should have been: ‘Awo’ politics. 
 
Rupture from Amala politics: contesting the legitimacy of distributive legacies in Nigeria’s 
southwest 
Under the banner of the Action Congress a handful of progressive governors were elected 
across the former Western region in 1999 (Adebanwi, 2014). The most striking case of 
transformation however was in Lagos. Two consecutive progressive governors managed to 
effect developmental reforms against the back drop of urban crisis and government failure. In 
particular, this transformation has won plaudits for not only achieving improvements in urban 
conditions but in apparently transforming the mode of governance, which has long been 
understood to be at the heart of Nigeria’s frustrated development. (“Africa: Lessons from 
Lagos,” 2012, “International: A rare good man; Nigeria’s business capital,” 2011)  The 
‘Lagos model’ that emerged was one of technocratic service-delivery state pursuing private-
sector driven development. In the space of a decade there were radical and visible 
improvements in waste collection, security and public infrastructure.  
The ‘new’ technocratic mode of governance was not dogmatically tied to the progressives 
programmatic aims however. Existing scholarly analyses highlight the skill with which Bola 
Tinubu, first as governor and then as sponsor of his protegee and former chief of staff 
Babatunde Fashola, managed elements of patronage, side payments to key groups and 
delivery of immediate economic benefits to the population (Fourchard, 2011; de Gramont, 
2015). For example hoodlums known as ‘area boys’ were absorbed into a newly formed 
division of traffic police to enable a security crackdown. These less technocratic elements 
were mobilised to overcome resistance and build support for longer-term developmental 
state-building projects such as expanding the tax base and tax compliance (LeBas and 
Cheeseman, 2013). In this way, Lagos is an example of the way that the framework  of 
programmatic versus patrimonial politics layers on to the normative framing of Lagos Model 
politicians themselves, as well as capturing the way that patronage can be ‘hacked’ and put to 
the service of programmatic aims (Cheeseman and de Gramont, 2017).  
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Indeed, across the southwest, progressive Yoruba politicians sought to replicate the Lagos 
Model in their own states. In addition to sharing core policy tenets, like a focus on physical 
infrastructure, public sector reform and pro-investor policies, they shared a common framing 
of programmatic versus patrimonial politics through which they narrated their political 
struggles. The ongoing struggles between the two major protagonists of Ekiti state politics 
from 2003 seemed to confirm the story of the southwest as programmatic versus patrimonial 
politics. Dr Kayode Fayemi was the epitome of programmatic politics: as candidate first for 
the ACN from 2013 the All Progressive’s Congress (APC) he reflected the Lagos Model’s 
most internationally palatable elements, having emerged from the world of civil society to be 
a beacon of good governance. Flagship policies included improving internet connectivity, 
improving Ekiti’s standing in the Ease of Doing Business Index and numerous partnerships 
with international donors (Ugwuanyi, 2014). By contrast Ayodele Fayose of the PDP was 
described as ‘the apotheosis of Adedibu’ (Ifowodo, 2014). From Fayose’s first election to the 
governorship in 2003 the two faced each other in every subsequent gubernatorial election, 
and repeated legal tussles over contested results. In a profile of Ekiti state the New York 
Times in described the situation surrounding the 2007 election in the following Manichean 
terms: “Mr. Fayemi’s campaign treads the treacherous middle ground between the high road, 
on which pro-democracy advocates have traditionally marched directly to defeat, and the 
bruising, money-driven politics that dominate Nigeria’s electoral contests.” The mainstream 
interpretation was that there were a virtuous minority of politicians, like Ekiti’s Dr Fayemi, 
who knew what good governance looked like: “the high road”. Yet, they were forced to make 
concessions to “money-driven politics” despite it making them ‘uncomfortable’, because, as 
Fayemi said, “this is what we live with.” (Polgreen 2006)  
 
In line with Fayemi’s diagnosis of being caught between ‘the high road’ and ‘money politics’ 
progressive politicians from the same party in Oyo sought a ‘rupture’ with the past and spoke 
of their radically transforming the basis of politics in the state. Much of this rupture was 
defined with regards to norms of distribution. Drawing on his travels abroad and career spent 
working in a multinational oil company, the new APC governor, Abiola Ajimobi, promised a 
break with amala politics and build legitimacy instead through modernising Oyo State (OSG 
Website, 2013, 2015). Oyo State, though less studied than Lagos State, presents the dilemmas 
of how to mix the politics of principle with patronage even more starkly than the more 
studied Lagos state.  Ajimobi adopted the package of policies that had worked so well in 
Lagos as a way of pursuing principled politics based on a vision of dis-embedding the state 
from patronage demands to pursue progress in the long-term. Compared with Lagos which 
hosts the headquarters of major regional banks and firms, Oyo state was much more 
economically vulnerable. With around 6% of the government revenue of its more 
cosmopolitan cousin, the Oyo state government was confronted with the rough edges of the 
trade-offs and difficult decisions posed by political transformation.  
Ajimobi and the political elites who backed him generally shared an ideologically driven 
opposition to the idea of the state as a provider. A member of Ajimobi’s campaign team in 
Ibadan explained that direct transfers to the poor were a moral hazard, by receiving 
something for free people would become lazy and unproductive.
iii
 A senior official closely 
linked to Ajimobi’s party, explained the problem as he saw it: ‘Oyo, over the years they’ve 
been used to a “something for nothing government” where they don’t offer anything in 
return.’iv Ajimobi’s Ajumose slogan summarised the belief that it was inappropriate for 
government to simply ‘do things for’ the people, rather state and society should do thing 
together, in partnership. Upon his election, Ajimobi built on the progressive politics of 
Obafemi Awolowo (Adebanwi, 2014, pp. 224–5). Where Awolowo, known as ‘the Sage’ had 
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pioneered universal education and modern development in the 1960s, Ajimobi built his 
appeal on a promise of progress in the 21
st
 century. This centred on a transformation of the 
state’s urban environment, which he achieved through urban renewal policies, including the 
demolition of thousands of roadside stalls, new roads and modern markets and a flagship 
flyover in the centre of the state capital (“Tinubu, Akande, Rochas rejoices with Ibadan on 
projects Commissioning.,” 2013). Progressive politicians in Oyo not only mobilized the 
implicit contrast between programmatic and patrimonial politics because they knew it would 
play well internationally – which it did – but because they harboured strong personal 
commitments to the underlying division between legitimate and illegitimate distribution that 
it embodies. They campaigning involved an attempt to change the mindsets of their 
constituents to make them accept that amala politics was in fact patrimonial, and as such 
should no longer be seen as an appropriate demand upon government. Articulated most 
clearly in a public address in 2014 Ajimobi’s vision of legitimate leadership was that a ‘good 
leader takes people to where they want to be’, i.e. distributes patronage, but ‘a great leader 
takes them where they ought to be’, i.e. progressive programmatic politics (Oladele, 2014). 
However, three years in to Ajimobi’s first term, political happenings in Ekiti raised 
the possibility that the lens of programmatic versus patrimonial politics was insufficient both 
as a political strategy and as an analytical device. Once Fayemi came to office in 2007 it was 
largely assumed that he would replicate the electoral success seen in Lagos. However, in July 
2014 after a four year term to showcasing what programmatic politics had to offer, Fayemi 
lost to Fayose (Akinrefon, 2014). Debates over how to interpret Fayose’s electoral appeal 
centre on his policy of “stomach infrastructure” whereby he gave out bags of rice and live 
chickens often accompanied by great media fanfare. On one view this was simply fulfilment 
of Fayemi’s pessimism, and an example of the distribution of private goods short circuiting 
democratic accountability and impeding the provision of public goods. However, others have 
shown how this distribution of immediate material benefits to the masses was electorally 
successful because it was understood by voters as signalling that Fayose would be attentive to 
their everyday concerns compared with an out of touch Fayemi who’s infrastructural reforms 
were weighted too far in favour of long-term future pay-off. Indeed, the term ‘stomach 
infrastructure’ itself shows that the systematic and large-scale promises of programmatic 
politics were not being ignored per se: rather, it makes the claim that the infrastructure that 
mattered is that which people would benefit from immediately. This highlights the risks of 
treating patronage as something that can simply be added to an otherwise programmatic 
platform to buy support for reforms, as in the standard account of Lagos Husaini’s 
ethnography of party loyalists show that some who received pre-election patronage from 
Fayemi found it disrespectful that at the last minute they had tried to buy their support 
despite, and choose to back Fayose as the more trust-worthy candidate (Husaini, 2018). If 
patronage is used as a tactic to top-up waning legitimacy for a programmatic agenda that is 
otherwise seen as out of touch, it risks backfiring and heightening the perceived ‘arrogance’ 
of a distant leader. 
 
In Oyo state opposition politicians contested not only the casting of amala as illegitimate, but 
questioned the legitimacy of the patterns of distribution that resulted from the more 
programmatic elements of Ajimobi’s policies such as urban renewal. This contestation 
involves not only claims to the legitimacy of what dominant scholarly frameworks would cast 
as patrimonial politics, but also the wholesomeness of those distributive strategies that are 
glossed as programmatic and thus legitimate. Six months before the 2015 gubernatorial 
election in Oyo a major Nigerian newspaper reported that the governor would lose because 
‘people will not vote for roads but what directly affects their lives’, where roads symbolised 
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Ajimobi’s emphasis on modern infrastructure (“The APC Government in Oyo State is gone – 
Senator Lekan Balogun,” 2014). People described Ajimobi as having no ‘human face’, and 
not being ‘people oriented’ (Esan, 2012; Amusat, 2015). A senior member of the PDP in Oyo 
State claimed that the governor had forgotten that leaders must have ‘empathy’ and ‘strive to 
alleviate the sufferings of the people by providing palliatives’, citing the role of alms-giving 
in Islam and Christianity (Taiwo, 2014). Whilst Ajimobi pursued a vision of principle 
without patronage, there were viable and well-resourced contenders who were willing to meet 
the unmet demand for a more caring leader. Political debate in the run up to the 2015 election 
shows that people read Ajimobi’s resistance to giving out patronage and his refusal to honour 
the legacy of leaders who showed human face as him not caring for his citizens. Ajimobi’s 
principled modernising agenda became unpopular (Atoyebi, 2014) as key policies– 
increasing taxes on shop signs, demolishing tens of thousands of roadside shops without 
compensation, and fining people for ‘environmental offences’ of waste dumping - imposed 
short term costs on the electorate (Ajayi, 2014). Urban renewal in particular drew much 
popular criticism. One opponent framed it as ‘neglecting the masses in favour of plants and 
flowers’ and urged voters to back his rival party ‘for deliverance from an insensitive 
government’ (Adekanmbi, 2013). When Ajimobi was in power, the memory of populist 
leaders was very much alive in Ibadan. Even 50 years after his death, Adelabu was still 
remembered fondly on the streets of Ibadan as a ‘political patron who ministered to the needs 
of the downtrodden’ (Omobowale and Olutayo, 2010, p. 453). The most powerful rivals to 
Ajimobi in the 2015 election had close ties with Adedibu
v
 and drew on this symbolic legacy 
of patronage embedded in and expressing normative values of ‘human face’ to challenge the 
legitimacy of Ajimobi’s agenda.  
Overall, the governor’s team seriously feared losing the 2015 election and had to re-evaluate 
the distributive effects of their policies. (Adekanmbi, 2015) Ajimobi’s spokesman explained 
how the perception of taxation being heavy, for example, was a threat to their re-election: 
‘We had to swim out of it by telling people that ‘look you cannot have development unless...’ 
But at the same time, we are being very careful in terms of imposing taxation on the 
people.’vi Moreover, the resources available to Ajimobi fell substantially in the final months 
of 2014.
vii
 From late 2014 the state government in Oyo was unable to pay salaries, let alone 
expand the distribution of resources. The governor had to find ways of responding to popular 
discontent over his efforts recast the obligations of government away from direct distribution. 
Resulting policies had to be framed in appropriate local norms of distribution without 
threatening the state government’s reputation with investors as a fiscally responsible (Oxford 
Business Group, 2013).   
3. EMPOWERMENT EVENTS IN OYO 
Since the beginning of his political career Ajimobi has run ‘empowerment projects’ of his 
own, out of a vocational training centre he had been running since the time when he entered 
the Senate in 2003.
viii
 As Governor, Ajimobi needed to engage in empowerment on a much 
larger scale. Immediate benefits were distributed by the state government and ruling party to 
select political constituencies though this required careful recalibration of the framing for 
different audiences. Each framing reflected a different conception of what sorts of 
distribution were legitimate.   
Loans to traders: Managing multiple framings of legitimate distribution 
In 2013, the APC in Oyo State started building up a network of associations called the 
Ajumose Coalition Movement (ACM) as part of APC electioneering efforts. The ACM was 
made up of pre-existing social and informal economic organisations that agreed to ally with 
the APC, and campaign for them around the election in exchange for access to some benefits. 
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By late 2014 the movement had 168 membership groups, including the Oyo branches of the 
National Carpenters Association, the Nigerian Barbers, the Butchers Association, and a 
hairdressers’ association. Ajimobi used this network to deliver interest-free loans, totalling 
N300m to market traders in advance of the election. The Governor and his team often 
referred to the loans as evidence of his ability to deliver empowerment to the grassroots 
(Ogunyemi, 2015) and thus counteract claims that his government had only helped the elites.  
Every stage of the process, from the initial pledge to the disbursement, was attended with 
extensive news coverage and publicity. In December 2013, Ajimobi made promises to the 
traders, at what was described in the news as an ‘interactive stakeholder meeting’. Six market 
associations were to get N50m each (Jegede, 2013). The promised funds were delivered a 
year later, at a ceremony at Lekan Salami Stadium that was broadcast by Channels 
Television. Six thousand traders attended (Johnson, 2014). The event featured singing, music, 
dancing and photo opportunities of the Governor handing out giant cardboard cheques.  
The event was framed in a way that balances the idioms of popular conceptions of good 
governance, with statements tying the government to the Lagos Model’s agenda of private 
sector-led development. On Channels TV the reporter’s voice-over explains how this program 
is not focused on consumption but aimed at larger processes of economic growth: ‘These 
traders now have a stronger capital base, and this is expected to transform their businesses’. 
The Special Adviser to the Governor on Trade and Investment said the programme ‘will drive 
the state forward and bring inclusive and sustainable development’ (Channels TV, 2014). The 
logic of group patronage (Omobowale, 2008) – giving the loans in lump sums to six 
supportive organisations – was re-framed in official discourse as a developmental targeting of 
marginalised and vulnerable individuals with loans that had transformative economic 
potential. For example, a representative of the Central Bank of Nigeria linked the programme 
not just to growth but to the buzzword ‘financial inclusion’. They explained it will make 
funds and finance available to ‘the most vulnerable groups, including micro, small and 
medium sized enterprises’ (Johnson, 2014).  
The loans were financed via the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) N220bn Micro, Small 
and Medium Entrepreneur Development Fund (MSMEDF) scheme, for which Oyo signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the CBN in July 2014 and formed part of the CBN’s 
2012 National Financial Inclusion Strategy. This allowed Ajimobi to enact political 
empowerment programmes to build his party support base, whilst simultaneously meeting the 
current donor priorities such as the World Bank’s Universal Financial Access goal, for which 
Nigeria was a target country (Bank, 2015). Ajimobi announced that the state government had 
its own target of 80% financial inclusion by 2020 (Johnson, 2014). The external financing of 
the loan programme also served a variety of purposes: maintaining the financial probity of the 
state government and opening up non-budgetary fiscal space for Ajimobi to respond to 
political demands that contradicted his stated principles. This scheme shows how the 
Governor found ways to deliver empowerment within the normative boundaries of 
programmatic politics. 
Whilst the reports on Channels TV was framed in line with the Lagos Model of 
programmatic politics the brute material facts of the programme overrode the uniform but 
superficial coding of the project as anything but patronage. The traders are reported as 
coming from ‘across the 33 Local Government Areas of Oyo State’ to benefit from the 
governor’s ‘Economic Empowerment Programme.’ Ajimobi referred to the loans as his ‘own 
stomach infrastructure’ (Channels TV, 2014). The overall programme – its aesthetics and its 
distributive party-political logic – fitted seamlessly into the existing ideas of what 
‘empowerment’ looks like, established over years of political performance by parties of all 
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stripes that ordinary Nigerians are familiar with both from lived experience and TV and 
newspaper reports. The loud-speakers, the dancing, the marquees, the photo opportunities 
were all familiar motifs of the generous governor sharing the dividends of democracy with 
the people. This opened up the realm of verbal discourse to serve alternative ends and 
audiences via intentional ambivalence. It gave space in Ajimobi’s speech and the 
contributions of government and CBN officials to an alternative interpretation: an 
interpretation of the event as a tool for financial inclusion and other donor-endorsed 
programmatic goals. Overall the empowerment event was a way for Ajimobi to engage in 
patronage, as in the distribution of immediate economic benefits, and demonstrate ‘human 
face’ whilst maintaining the rupture from amala politics as vote buying or reckless giving. 
Amala, vote-buying or empowerment? 
In addition to the stadium-filling empowerment event broadcast on television, there was a 
second series of ACM empowerment events hosted by Ajimobi’s wife. These also involved 
inviting members of associations to campaign sessions where they received material goods 
including minibuses, APC-branded cloth, motorbikes and transformers, and pledged their 
support for the party. Between March 16
th
 and April 7
th
, 2015, 16 groups, comprising market, 
religious and youth associations attended small private rallies with Florence Ajimobi. 
However, without the framing of the CBN financial inclusion agenda, these distributions 
were harder for the progressives to clearly distinguish from amala politics and they were not 
advertised in the same way as the loans. In fact, the only online sources of evidence for such 
gifts was on Florence Ajimobi’s Facebook page and used Florence Ajimobi as their 
figurehead, rather than the Governor himself. These smaller empowerment events were so 
explicitly linked to the party – through the branded APC cloth that was given out, for 
example – that they were best kept out of sight of external audiences. Nonetheless, in my 
interview with him, the campaign manager of the ACM confirmed that it was state 
government money that went towards financing these benefits and that they were directed 
towards those who had signed up to support the APC. 
The ambivalence and discomfort of this blurring was reflected in the campaign manager’s 
account of the schemes. He explained:  
“Oga succeeded... [pauses] in giving out about 80 to 100 buses. To all these 
associations. So, each association that has the resources, they will give them buses.”ix 
I put it to Ade that this was a form of vote buying, which he denied; ‘No, it’s not they 
are buying votes! Because we did it before the election [his voice grows] we are not 
buying vote! It is just like responsibility of government to the people. ... We don’t 
need to buy votes.  It’s because they were convinced.’x  
The association leaders I spoke to approved of the Ajumose Coalition Movement process 
and were comfortable with the quid pro quo involved. The Babaloja of a major market in 
central Ibadan who helped negotiate the deal noted that they were successful in their demands 
because the government ‘needed our votes’. Many of the groups that had benefitted made 
public statements in favour of Ajimobi’s second term and the large umbrella groups 
organized an appreciation rally in early 2015 to show their support for Ajimobi (Adeniyi, 
2014). For example the Spokesman for the Oyo Joint Traders Association announced at a 
rally on 9 February 2015 that the association was endorsing Ajimobi for a second term (“Mrs 
Ajimobi seeks traders’ support for husband, APC candidates,” 2015). From interviews with 
other traders there was evidence that even just the news of the scheme had a positive effect 
on Ajimobi’s reputation. They hoped that perhaps when Ajimobi got back into power he 
would undertake another round of loans and they would benefit
xi
.  
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Moreover, the ACM provided targeted access to Ajimobi himself, who otherwise was seen 
as a remote Governor. The campaign manager went back to each member group once a 
month to meet with the chairmen and executive for ‘interactive sessions’ where information 
flowed both ways. The campaign manager explained that he would ‘educate them about 
government policies’ and they would tell him ‘what are those things that they want 
government to do for them.’xii Thus beyond its material effects, the loan package showed 
that, in contrast to his image as ‘out of touch’, Ajimobi was a man who could be negotiated 
with. As predicted by Schaffer and Schedler’s (2007, p. 17) work on vote-buying, with the 
loans serving “as pieces of information that reveal the positive personal qualities of the giver, 
such as generosity, politeness, responsiveness, and respect”. Just as the APC derived 
legitimacy by promising the progress that their populist predecessors failed to provide, they 
were nonetheless evaluated against the memory of an established repertoire of distributive 
and associational practices. Even as Ajimobi resisted these, familiar idioms such as 
‘empowerment’ still served as aesthetic resources through which his own programmes could 
be linked with immediate benefits.   
Just as with the loans to traders scheme, photos of the federal government’s TraderMoni 
show women dancing in bright yellow branded t-shirts whilst clutching loan documents. The 
parallels extend to debates about vote-buying at the national level, with rival accounts of the 
conditions under which such distribution would be legitimate. The chairman of Transparency 
International Nigeria described TraderMoni as “voter inducement” due to its proximity to the 
2019 presidential election and argued that was equivalent to the President using public funds 
for his re-election campaign. Moreover, seeing as it was not in the APC manifesto the 
President lacked a mandate for using state funds in such a way. PDP big-shot and Senate 
President Bukola Saraki also opposed the scheme but on different ground. The distribution of 
loans was not problematic per se but the timing brought it into question: “[they] should have 
been doing it since 2015.” Moreover, the use of party networks to distribute the funds was not 
a problem in itself, but rather its partiality. As he said, “At least, if you’re going and since it 
is Nigerian money he should have women leaders of all the political parties because the 
money belongs to Nigeria.” (“Saraki to FG,” 2018) As in Oyo, officials, this time at the Bank 
of Industry, defended TraderMoni on the grounds of financial inclusion. 
4. RE-READING NIGERIAN POLITICS: BEYOND PROGRAMMATIC VERSUS PATRIMONIAL 
POLITICS 
 
This analysis has implications not only for Oyo state but for how we read politics in Nigeria 
more generally. Within the dominant understanding of Nigerian politics the phenomenon of 
giving loans to traders would be understood as programmatic politics being pulled in the 
direction of patrimonialism. On this reading, both Ajimobi’s deviation from the Lagos Model 
in Oyo state and the last-minute introduction of TraderMoni by Osinbajo and Buhari, are 
cases of upstanding leaders having to go against their principles and engage in patronage. 
Indeed, this is largely the story that Lagos Model politicians told about their own political 
maneuvers. However, this article suggests that this is not the only lens through which to make 
sense of political contestation in Nigeria. Rather than a tale of ‘corruption fights back’ 
(Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011) or the triumph of the patrimonial under a neopatrimonial 
façade, it demonstrates the partial ways in which popular conceptions of good governance 
can be reasserted against technocratic visions that people see as non-transparent, inaccessible 
and distant. The Oyo 2015 election and the story of 21
st
 century Nigerian politics more 
generally can thus be understood as contestation over what counts as legitimate distribution.   
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As such the discussion presented in this article challenges recent work on what politics 
should look like in Africa.  Bleck and Van de Walle analyse news reports in the lead up to 
elections in nine Africans countries, including Nigeria, to argue that much of the current 
political discourse concerns issues “over which there is broad agreement.” (2013, p. 1397) 
These ‘valence issues’ stand in contrast to position statements whereby concrete plans of 
action are set out differentiating the parties from each other: “disagreement focuses not on the 
ultimate objective of policy about which there is consensus, but instead on how to attain 
desired goals and who is more likely to succeed in doing so." (Bleck and van de Walle, 2013, 
p. 1397) On this view, democratic accountability is undermined because the majority of 
statements made by Nigerian contenders for state office pertain to “issues on which everyone 
agrees” such as anti-corruption and development. It is hoped that with greater 
institutionalization parties in Africa will move towards not only programmatic politics, but a 
gold-standard of politics based on position statement. The implicit claim is that voters should 
get to choose between distinct policy approaches to achieve these universally agreed goals.  
 
No doubt, such practical policy debates are an important ingredient of political contestation. 
However, the case of Oyo state shows that this conception of good politics rules out 
important meta-questions. Given the scale of Bleck and van de Walle’s nine country study, it 
inevitably misses the ways in which discourse that they describe as valence nonetheless 
represents contestation over the larger question of how development should be understood 
and what the appropriate boundaries of government actions are. For example, they claim that 
“actors cannot take a stand “against development,” and, therefore, conversations about 
economic development and poverty alleviation typically involve posturing for credibility 
rather than substantive disagreements." (Bleck and van de Walle, 2013, p. 1405)   But the 
analysis above shows that politicians contest the meaning of development via terms like 
“people-centric”, “human face” and “stomach infrastructure”. Whilst these terms may at first 
glance may appear to be blandly positive ‘valence terms’ – reflect deeper and more 
fundamental underlying disagreements. Much of this discussion can be traced back 
fundamental debates over what forms of distribution are legitimate: debates which are 
obscured if we naturalise the conceptual framework of programmatic versus patrimonial 
politics as somehow existing prior to politics.  
 
Building on the work of Herbert Kitschelt (2007), Bleck and van de Walle argue that valence 
issues tend to dominate in clientelistic systems because politicians tend to “distinguish 
themselves through their ability to deliver tangible benefits to constituents.” (2013, p. 1397) 
Indeed, they recognize that structural features of African democratic systems lead 
‘programmatic’ commitments to be frustratingly intangible. African leaders face uncertainty 
stemming from the volatility of their insertion into the global economy, dependence on 
sometimes fleeting donor agendas and a wider under-institutionalisation of state power. 
Whilst they link this to the neo-classical need to make credible policy commitments, similar 
observations have also been linked to the status of many African states as ‘choiceless 
democracies’ on the grounds that significant policy options are foreclosed by their 
dependence on not only donors but how they are perceived by international capital 
(Mkandawire, 1998, 2009).  Emerging development agendas like the Sustainable 
Development Goals which put private sector actors at their heart rely on theories of change 
where the link between government spending and the poor is increasingly truncated (Bayliss 
and Waeyenberge, 2018, p. 580). Indeed, Lagos State’s flagship projects include privately-
built infrastructure, such as Eko Atlantic and the toll-maintained Lekki Expressway, which 
symbolize ambitious programmes of modernisation whilst nonetheless excluding many on the 
ability to pay. For voters in Oyo weighing up the promise of programmatic politics under the 
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Lagos Model, they might be forgiven for preferring what Bleck and van de Walle dismiss as 
‘tangible benefits’.  
CONCLUSION:  
 
Politics is indeed about distribution, but encompasses more than simply what public goods 
the state should provide and how. It encompasses meta-level questions about what sort of 
politics is good politics and the standards and norms against which people, parties and 
policies should be judged. By suspending the long-standing scholarly instinct to read 
Nigerian politics in terms of programmatic versus patrimonial politics we open up the 
possibility that democracy in Africa is doing much more interesting things than simply 
operating as a feedback mechanism for the performance of politicians against set criteria. 
Unlike the assumptions of much of the current quantitative literature, there are substantive 
political struggles that go beyond ‘public goods good, private goods bad’. The scholarly 
framing of programmatic versus patrimonial politics obscures the essentially contested nature 
of what counts as legitimate distribution. This article has shown that the idea of patrimonial 
versus programmatic politics does not stand outside of politics but is in itself a politically 
constructed distinction. In adopting it a priori as scholars we commit ourselves to seeing the 
world through the eyes of a specific, often elite, constituency that makes up only part of the 
rich landscape of normative political contestation in Nigeria.  
 
Much of the existing literature conceives of African countries as somewhere along a 
teleological path leading to convergence on a narrowly conceived vision of good politics that 
works for development. In a context of continuing high level of poverty and deprivation on 
the continent some would say that this level of prescriptiveness is justified by the urgency of 
the task African politicians must contend with. On a continent where two thirds of people 
lack access to clean water the need for more and better public goods provision could be taken 
to be a no-brainer . However, contrary to those who see both as valence terms, ‘good politics’ 
and ‘development’ are both contested terms in southwest Nigeria and beyond. If it was true 
that developmental challenges induced technocratic consensus then we wouldn’t see the 
profound debates and paradigm shifts that characterise the development industry – as 
evidence in the revolution in social protection and the rise of cash transfers over recent 
decades.  The same question, posed to an academic audience by Joe Hanlon in 2004, is 
essentially at the heart of ongoing political contestation in Nigeria today: is it possible to just 
give money to the poor?  
  
16 
 
REFERENCES 
Adebanwi, W., 2014. Yorùbá Elites and Ethnic Politics in Nigeria: Obáfemi Awólowo and Corporate 
Agency. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY. 
Adebanwi, W., 2005. The Carpenter’s Revolt: Youth, Violence and the Reinvention of Culture in 
Nigeria. J. Mod. Afr. Stud. 43, 339–365. 
Adekanmbi, D., 2015. Why Ajimobi’ll be re-elected - Alabi. Niger. Trib. 
Adekanmbi, D., 2013. Lawmaker empowers constituents with working tools. Tribune. 
Adeniyi, A., 2014. Traders endorse Ajimobi for second term. The Nation. 
Adeyemo, A., 2008. The Godfather Finally Sleeps. ThisDay. 
Africa: Lessons from Lagos, 2012. . Financ. Times. 
Agbaje, A., 2002. Personal rule and regional politics: Ibadan under military regimes, 1986-1996, in: 
Money, Struggles and City Life: Devaluation in Ibadan and Other Urban Cetnres in Southern 
Nigeria 1886-1996. Heinemann, Portsmouth NH. 
Ajayi, O., 2014. Oyo 2015: Why Ajimobi should start packing now — Lekan Balogun. Vanguard 
News. 
Akinrefon, D., 2014. Ayo Fayose wins Ekiti elections. Vanguard News. 
Amusat, K., 2015. Who will Oyo elect as its new governor? ThisDay. 
Animasawun, G.A., 2013. Godfatherism in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: The Pyramid of Violence and 
Political Insecurity in Ibadan, Oyo-State, Nigeria (No. 27), IFRA-Nigeria E-Papers series. 
IFRA-Nigeria, Nigeria. 
Atoyebi, O., 2014. Criticism against Ajimobi frivolous –Attorney-General. Punch. 
Bank, 2015. Putting the tools in place for greater financial inclusion in Nigeria. World Bank. URL 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/08/20/putting-the-tools-in-place-for-greater-
financial-inclusion-in-nigeria (accessed 11.21.16). 
Barber, K., 1995. Money, self-realization and the person in Yorùbá texts, in: Money Matters : 
Instability, Values and Social Payments in the Modern History of West African Communities. 
Heinemann, Portsmouth NH, pp. 205–224. 
Bayliss, K., Waeyenberge, E.V., 2018. Unpacking the Public Private Partnership Revival. J. Dev. 
Stud. 54, 577–593. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2017.1303671 
Bleck, J., van de Walle, N., 2013. Valence Issues in African Elections: Navigating Uncertainty and 
the Weight of the Past. Comp. Polit. Stud. 46, 1394–1421. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012453448 
Booth, D., Golooba-Mutebi, F., 2012. Developmental patrimonialism? The case of Rwanda. Afr. Aff. 
111, 379–403. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ads026 
Bratton, M., van de Walle, N., 1994. Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa. 
World Polit. 46, 453–489. https://doi.org/10.2307/2950715 
Channels TV, 2014. 6,000 Traders Get Interest-Free Loans In Oyo State. Ibadan. 
Cheeseman, N., de Gramont, D., 2017. Managing a mega-city: learning the lessons from Lagos. Oxf. 
Rev. Econ. Policy 33, 457–477. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grx033 
de Gramont, D., 2015. Governing Lagos: Unlocking the Politics of Reform. Carnegie Endow. Int. 
Peace. 
Esan, A., 2012. Oyo minority leader counsels Ajimobi on 2013 Budget. Natl. Mirror. 
Fourchard, L., 2011. Lagos, Koolhaas and Partisan Politics in Nigeria. Int. J. Urban Reg. Res. 35, 40–
56. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2010.00938.x 
Gadjanova, E., 2017. Electoral clientelism as status affirmation in Africa: evidence from Ghana. J. 
Mod. Afr. Stud. 55, 593–621. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X17000416 
Grindle, M.S., 2004. Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing 
Countries. Governance 17, 525–548. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0952-1895.2004.00256.x 
Guyer, J.I. (Ed.), 1995. Money Matters: Instability, Values and Social Payments in the Modern 
History of West African Communities. James Currey, Portsmouth, NH; London. 
Hanlon, J., 2004. It is Possible to Just Give Money to the Poor. Dev. Change 35, 375–383. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2004.00356.x 
Hoffmann, L., Nolte, I., 2013. The Roots of Neopatrimonialism: Opposition Politics and Popular 
Consent in Southwest Nigeria, in: Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria: Critical 
Interpretations. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, NY, pp. 25–52. 
  
17 
 
Hossain, N., 2007. The Politics of What Works: The Case of the Vulnerable Group Development 
Programme in Bangladesh (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 1629297). Social Science Research 
Network, Rochester, NY. 
Husaini, S., 2018. Testing Loyalty: Electoral Politicking between stomach infrastructure, mai gaskiya, 
and moral competence, in: Normative Politics in Africa Workshop. Queen Elizabeth House, 
Oxford. 
Ifowodo, O., 2014. Ekiti Verdict 2014: The Apotheosis of Adedibu. Vanguard News. 
International: A rare good man; Nigeria’s business capital, 2011. . The Economist 55. 
Jegede, J., 2013. Ajimobi promises Oyo traders N300 million interest-free loan. Prem. Times. 
Johnson, T., 2014. Ajimobi gives N300m to traders. The Nation. URL 
http://thenationonlineng.net/new/ajimobi-gives-n300m-traders/ (accessed 1.13.15). 
Kelsall, T., 2011. Going with the Grain in African Development? Dev. Policy Rev. 29, s223–s251. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2011.00527.x 
Khan, M.H., 2005. Markets, states and democracy: Patron–client networks and the case for 
democracy in developing countries. Democratization 12, 704–724. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340500322157 
Kitschelt, H., 2007. Party Systems, in: Boix, C., Stokes, S.C. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Politics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. 
Kramon, E., 2017. Money for Votes: The Causes and Consequences of Electoral Clientelism in 
Africa. Cambridge University Press. 
Layonu, T.A., 2003. Adelabuism : politics of Adegoke Adelabu, the legendary leader of Ibadan 
people. Media Report Projects, Ibadan, Nigeria. 
LeBas, A., Cheeseman, N., 2013. The Lagos Experiment: Services Delivery, Tax Collection, and 
Popular Attitudes (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 2253686). Social Science Research 
Network, Rochester, NY. 
Lindberg, S.I., 2013. Mapping accountability: core concept and subtypes. Int. Rev. Adm. Sci. 79, 
202–226. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852313477761 
Lindberg, S.I., 2010. What accountability pressures do MPs in Africa face and how do they respond? 
Evidence from Ghana<a href="#fn01a">*</a>. J. Mod. Afr. Stud. 48, 117–142. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X09990243 
Mkandawire, T., 2009. Institutional Monocropping and Monotasking in Africa (Democracy, 
Governance and Well-Being Programme Paper No. 1). United Nations Research Institute for 
Social Development, Geneva. 
Mkandawire, T., 1998. Crisis management and the making of ‘choiceless democracies’ in Africa, in: 
Joseph, R.A. (Ed.), State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa. Lynne Rienner Pub, Boulder, 
Colo. 
Mrs Ajimobi seeks traders’ support for husband, APC candidates, 2015. . News Agency Niger. 
Mueller, L., 2018. Personal Politics without Clientelism? Interpreting Citizen-Politician Contact in 
Africa. Afr. Stud. Rev. 61, 28–54. https://doi.org/10.1017/asr.2017.131 
Nic Cheeseman, 2014. Politics Meets Policies: The Emergence of Programmatic Political Parties. 
IDEAS, Stockholm. 
Ogunyemi, D., 2015. How Ajimobi Broke Second Term Jinx in Oyo. Dly. Trust Abuja. 
Oladele, B., 2014. States lack autonomy says Ajimobi. The Nation. 
Olivier de Sardan, J.-P., 1999. A moral economy of corruption in Africa? J. Mod. Afr. Stud. 37, 25–
52. 
Omobowale, A., 2008. Clientelism and social structure : an analysis of patronage in Yoruba social 
thought. Afr. Spectr. 43. 
Omobowale, A., Olutayo, A., 2010. Political Clientelism and Rural Development in South-Western 
Nigeria. Africa 80. 
Omobowale, A., Olutayo, A., 2007. Chief Lamidi Adedibu and Patronage Politics in Nigeria. J. Mod. 
Afr. Stud. 45, 425–446. 
OSG Website, 2015. Full text of Governor Ajimobi’s inaugural speech. Website Oyo State Gov. URL 
http://www.oyostate.gov.ng/full-text-of-governor-ajimobis-inaugural-speech/ (accessed 
4.14.16). 
  
18 
 
OSG Website, 2014. Ajimobi raises alarm over dwindling allocation to states. Oyo State Gov. 
Website. URL http://www.oyostate.gov.ng/ajimobi-raises-alarm-over-dwindling-allocation-
to-states/ (accessed 11.5.15). 
OSG Website, 2013. Text of Gov Ajimobi’s Budget Speech 2013. Website Oyo State Gov. URL 
http://www.oyostate.gov.ng/text-of-gov-ajimobis-budget-speech/ (accessed 2.9.15). 
Oxford Business Group, 2013. Opening doors to investment [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/opening-doors-investment-state-set-serve-
new-investors-it-streamlines-procedures-and-improves (accessed 11.2.16). 
Paller, J., 2014. Informal Institutions and Personal Rule in Urban Ghana. Afr. Stud. Rev. 57, 123–142. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/asr.2014.95 
Peel, J.D.Y., 1983. Ijeshas and Nigerians : The Incorporation of a Yoruba Kingdom 1890-1970s. 
Cambridge University Press,. 
Sanches, E.R., 2018. Party Systems in Young Democracies : Varieties of institutionalization in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315200354 
Saraki to FG: Involve opposition in Trader moni or scrap it, 2018. . Trib. Online. URL 
https://www.tribuneonlineng.com/176312/ (accessed 2.5.19). 
Schaffer, F.C., Schedler, A., 2007. What is vote-buying?, in: Schaffer, F.C. (Ed.), Elections for Sale: 
The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colo. 
Taiwo, O., 2014. Politics of poverty alleviation schemes. Tribune. 
The APC Government in Oyo State is gone – Senator Lekan Balogun, 2014. . The Punch. 
Timothy, G., 2008. Adedibu - Who takes Over the Garrison Command? Leadership. 
Tinubu, Akande, Rochas rejoices with Ibadan on projects Commissioning., 2013. . The Guardian. 
TraderMoni is vote buying, says Transparency International, 2019. . Punch Newsp. 
Ugwuanyi, S., 2014. Fayemi speaks on achievements during his tenure as Ekiti Governor. Dly. Post 
Niger. 
Vicente, P.C., Wantchekon, L., 2009. Clientelism and vote buying: lessons from field experiments in 
African elections. Oxf. Rev. Econ. Policy 25, 292–305. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grp018 
Watson, R., 2000. Murder and the Political Body in Early Colonial Ibadan. Africa 70, 25–48. 
https://doi.org/10.3366/afr.2000.70.1.25 
Watson, R., 1998. The Cloth of Field of Gold: Material Culture and Civic Power in Colonial Ibadan. 
J. Hist. Sociol. 11, 461–491. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6443.00073 
World Bank, 2016. Making Politics Work for Development: Harnessing Transparency and Citizen 
Engagement. The World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0771-8 
 
  
  
19 
 
NOTES 
                                                          
i
  Quoted in “Oyo: Why our people are angry with Gov Ajimobi — Teslim Folarin” 
Vanguard News, December 22 2014.  
ii
           Quoted in Hanlon 2004 pg.375 
iii
  I-28 Member of Ajimobi's Campaign Team, Ibadan, 26/05/2015 
iv 
 I-33 Staff member of DAWN Commission, Ibadan 05/06/2015 
v
  Adedibu’s first protégé Rashidi Ladoja was Governor for the PDP between 2003-
2006 before becoming estranged from Adedibu. He contested the 2015 election on the 
Accord ticket. The two other major rivals to Ajimobi were also former protégés of Adedibu: 
Teslim Folarin (PDP) and former governor Christopher Akala (Labour Party).   
vi 
 I-17 Special Adviser to the Governor, Ibadan, 22/04/2015 
vii
  When Ajimobi first came to power, the monthly federal allocation to Oyo State was 
approximately N4.2bn and the cost of wages and salaries was N2.9bn. Due to low oil prices, 
by November 2014 revenue fell to N3.2bn whilst salaries grew to N5bn, leaving a monthly 
deficit of N1.8bn (OSG Website, 2014). 
viii
  AJ1-1 and AJ1-2 Staff of Ajumose Vocational Training Centre, Ibadan 21/05/2015.  
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 CLG 4-1 Local Government Caretaker Chairman, Ibadan 05/08/2015 
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